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The concept of a stable model provided a declarative semantics for Prolog programs
with negation as failure and became a starting point for the development of answer set
programming. In this paper we propose a new deﬁnition of that concept, which covers
many constructs used in answer set programming and, unlike the original deﬁnition, refers
neither to grounding nor to ﬁxpoints. It is based on a syntactic transformation similar to
parallel circumscription.
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1. Introduction
Answer set programming (ASP) is a form of declarative logic programming oriented towards knowledge-intensive search
problems, such as product conﬁguration and planning. It was identiﬁed as a new programming paradigm ten years ago [25,
29], and it has found by now a number of serious applications. An ASP program consists of rules that are syntactically
similar to Prolog rules, but the computational mechanisms used in ASP are different: they use the ideas that have led to the
creation of fast satisﬁability solvers for propositional logic [11].
ASP is based on the concept of a stable model [9]. According to the deﬁnition, to decide which sets of ground atoms are
“stable models” of a given set of rules we ﬁrst replace each of the given rules by all its ground instances. Then we verify
a ﬁxpoint condition that is similar to the conditions employed in the semantics of default logic [33] and autoepistemic
logic [28] (see [19, Sections 4, 5] for details).
In this paper we investigate a new approach to deﬁning the concept of a stable model. It is based on a syntactic
transformation similar to circumscription [26,27]. The new deﬁnition refers neither to grounding nor to ﬁxpoints. It turns
out to be more general, in a number of ways, than the original deﬁnition.
This treatment of stable models may be of interest for several reasons. First, it provides a new perspective on the
place of stable models within the ﬁeld of nonmonotonic reasoning. We can distinguish between “ﬁxpoint” nonmonotonic
formalisms, such as default logic and autoepistemic logic, and “translational” formalisms, such as program completion [1]
and circumscription. In the past, stable models were seen as part of the “ﬁxpoint tradition.” The remarkable similarity
between the new deﬁnition of a stable model and the deﬁnition of circumscription is curious from this point of view.
Second, we expect that the new deﬁnition of a stable model will provide a uniﬁed framework for useful answer set
programming constructs that have been deﬁned and implemented by different research groups. For instance, it may help us
combine choice rules in the sense of lparse [34] with aggregates in the sense of dlv [3]. A step in this direction is described
in [14].
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value. This may be useful for knowledge representation purposes; we may wish to write, for instance:
Father(Jack) = Father(Jane).
This possibility is related also to the use of arithmetic functions in ASP, when different ground terms may have the same
value (2+ 2= 1+ 3).
The new deﬁnition of a stable model is introduced in Section 2, and its relation to the original deﬁnition is discussed
in Section 3. Several useful theorems about the new concept are stated in Section 4. Then we extend the idea of strong
equivalence to this framework (Section 5), relate general stable models to program completion (Section 6), and deﬁne
“pointwise stable models,” which are similar to pointwise circumscription (Section 7). In Section 8, we show how our
theory of stable models handles strong (or classical) negation, and Section 9 discusses related work. Proofs of theorems are
collected in Appendix A.
To make the presentation more self-contained, we include brief reviews of parallel and pointwise circumscription (Sec-
tions 2.2 and 7.1) and of two approaches to the stable model semantics proposed earlier (Section 3.1).
This article is an extended version of the conference paper [6].
2. Stable models
2.1. Logic programs as ﬁrst-order sentences
The concept of a stable model will be deﬁned here for ﬁrst-order sentences,1 possibly containing function constants
and equality. Logic programs are viewed in this paper as alternative notation for ﬁrst-order sentences of special types. For
instance, we treat the logic program
p(a,a),
p(a,b),
q(x) ← p(x, y) (1)
as shorthand for
p(a,a) ∧ p(a,b) ∧ ∀xy(p(x, y) → q(x)). (2)
The constraint
← p(x),not q(x) (3)
is identiﬁed with the formula
∀x¬(p(x) ∧ ¬q(x)),
and the disjunctive rule
p(x);q(y) ← r(x, y)
with
∀xy(r(x, y) → (p(x) ∨ q(y))).
As another example, take the choice rule{
p(x)
}← q(x).
It says, informally speaking: for every x such that q(x), choose arbitrarily whether or not to include p(x) in the stable model.
We can treat this rule as shorthand for
∀x(q(x) → (p(x) ∨ ¬p(x))). (4)
This formula is logically valid, so that appending it as a conjunctive term to any sentence F would not change the class of
models of F . But the class of stable models of F may change, as we will see, after appending (4).
The next example involves an aggregate. The rule
p(x) ← #card{y: q(x, y)}< 2
means intuitively: if the cardinality of the set {y: q(x, y)} is less than 2 then include p(x) in the stable model. We can treat
this rule as an abbreviation for the formula
∀x(¬∃y1 y2(q(x, y1) ∧ q(x, y2) ∧ y1 	= y2)→ p(x)). (5)
1 A sentence is a formula without free variables.
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Since the new deﬁnition of a stable model is similar to the deﬁnition of parallel circumscription, we will begin with a
brief review of the latter.
Both deﬁnitions use the following notation. If p and q are predicate constants of the same arity then p  q stands for
the formula
∀x(p(x) → q(x)),
where x is a tuple of distinct object variables. If p and q are tuples p1, . . . , pn and q1, . . . ,qn of predicate constants then
p q stands for the conjunction
(p1  q1) ∧ · · · ∧ (pn  qn),
and p< q stands for (p q) ∧ ¬(q p). In second-order logic, we apply the same notation to tuples of predicate variables.
Let p be a list of distinct predicate constants.2 The circumscription operator with the minimized predicates p, denoted by
CIRCp , is deﬁned as follows: for any ﬁrst-order formula F , CIRCp[F ] is the second-order formula
F ∧ ¬∃u((u< p) ∧ F (u)),
where u is a list of distinct predicate variables of the same length as p, and F (u) is the formula obtained from F by
substituting the variables u for the constants p.3
If the list p is empty then we understand CIRCp[F ] as F . We will drop the subscript in the symbol CIRCp when this does
not lead to confusion.
For any sentence F , a p-minimal (or simply minimal) model of F is an interpretation of the underlying signature that
satisﬁes CIRCp[F ]. Since the ﬁrst conjunctive term of CIRCp[F ] is F , it is clear that every minimal model of F is a model
of F .
Example 1. If F is formula (2) then CIRCpq[F ] is
∀xy(p(a,a) ∧ p(a,b) ∧ (p(x, y) → q(x)))
∧¬∃uv(((u, v) < (p,q))∧ ∀xy(u(a,a) ∧ u(a,b) ∧ (u(x, y) → v(x)))).
It can be equivalently rewritten without second-order variables as follows:
∀x(p(x, y) ↔ (x= a∧ y = a) ∨ (x= a∧ y = b))∧ ∀x(q(x) ↔ x= a). (6)
Example 2. Let F be the formula
∀xy(p(x, y) → t(x, y))∧ ∀xyz(t(x, y) ∧ t(y, z) → t(x, z)) (7)
(“p is a subset of t , and t is a transitive relation”). Then CIRCt[F ] is
∀xy(p(x, y) → t(x, y))∧ ∀xyz(t(x, y) ∧ t(y, z) → t(x, z))
∧¬∃u((u < t) ∧ ∀xy(p(x, y) → u(x, y))∧ ∀xyz(u(x, y) ∧ u(y, z) → u(x, z))).
This condition cannot be expressed by a ﬁrst-order formula, but its meaning is straightforward: it says that t is the transitive
closure of p.
If we conjoin (7) with
p(a,b) ∧ p(b, c) (8)
and include both p and t in the list of minimized predicates then the circumscription formula will become expressible in
ﬁrst-order logic as
∀xy(p(x, y) ↔ (x= a∧ y = b) ∨ (x = b ∧ y = c))
∧∀xy(t(x, y) ↔ (x= a∧ y = b) ∨ (x= b ∧ y = c) ∨ (x= a∧ y = c)). (9)
2 In this paper, equality is not considered a predicate constant, so that it is not allowed to be a member of p.
3 This deﬁnition of the circumscription operator allows F to have free variables, unlike the deﬁnition from [17]. Similarly, the deﬁnition of the stable
model operator below is applicable to formulas with free variables, unlike the deﬁnition proposed in the conference paper [6].
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We will now deﬁne the stable model operator with the intensional predicates p, denoted by SMp . Some details of the
deﬁnition depend on which propositional connectives and quantiﬁers are treated as primitives, and which of them are
viewed as abbreviations. Let us decide that the primitives are
⊥ (falsity), ∧, ∨, →, ∀, ∃;
¬F is an abbreviation for F → ⊥,  stands for ⊥ → ⊥, and F ↔ G stands for (F → G) ∧ (G → F ).
Let p be a list of distinct predicate constants p1, . . . , pn . For any ﬁrst-order formula F , by SMp[F ] we denote the second-
order formula
F ∧ ¬∃u((u< p) ∧ F ∗(u)),
where u is a list of n distinct predicate variables u1, . . . ,un , and F ∗(u) is deﬁned recursively:
• pi(t)∗ = ui(t) for any tuple t of terms;
• F ∗ = F for any atomic formula F that does not contain members of p 4;
• (F ∧ G)∗ = F ∗ ∧ G∗;
• (F ∨ G)∗ = F ∗ ∨ G∗;
• (F → G)∗ = (F ∗ → G∗) ∧ (F → G);
• (∀xF )∗ = ∀xF ∗;
• (∃xF )∗ = ∃xF ∗ .
If the list p is empty then we understand SMp[F ] as F . We will drop the subscript in the symbol SMp when this does not
lead to confusion.
For any sentence F , a p-stable (or simply stable) model of F is an interpretation of the underlying signature that satisﬁes
SMp[F ].5 Since the ﬁrst conjunctive term of SMp[F ] is F , it is clear that every stable model of F is a model of F .
Note that if we drop the second conjunctive term from the clause for implication in the deﬁnition of F ∗(u) then this
formula will turn into F (u), and SM[F ] will turn into CIRC[F ]. It follows that for any sentence F that does not contain
implication, SM[F ] coincides with CIRC[F ], and the stable models of F are identical to the minimal models of F .
In the next section we will see examples when these two formulas are equivalent to each other even though F does
contain implication. We will see also that there are cases when minimal models are not stable, and when stable models are
not minimal.
2.4. Examples
Example 1 (continued). Let F be formula (2). As noted above, CIRCpq[F ] is equivalent to (6). Consider the result of applying
SMpq to the same formula. Clearly F ∗(u, v) is
u(a,a) ∧ u(a,b) ∧ ∀xy((u(x, y) → v(x))∧ (p(x, y) → q(x))),
and SMpq[F ] is
p(a,a) ∧ p(a,b) ∧ ∀xy(p(x, y) → q(x))
∧¬∃uv(((u, v) < (p,q))∧ u(a,a) ∧ u(a,b) ∧ ∀xy((u(x, y) → v(x))∧ (p(x, y) → q(x)))).
In the presence of the conjunctive term ∀xy(p(x, y) → q(x)) at the beginning of the formula, the conjunctive term p(x, y) →
q(x) at the end can be dropped. This simpliﬁcation turns SMpq[F ] into CIRCpq[F ]. Consequently, SMpq[F ] is equivalent to (6)
as well.
Remark 1. It is easy to see that, more generally, SM[F ] is equivalent to CIRC[F ] whenever F is a conjunction such that every
conjunctive term
• does not contain implication, or
• is the universal closure of a formula G → H such that G and H do not contain implication.
Remark 2. The equivalence of SMpq[F ] to (6) in Example 1 can be established also in another way, without references
to circumscription. In Sections 6.2 and 7.3 we will show how the theory of tight programs [4,2] can be extended to the
4 This includes the case when F is ⊥.
5 The deﬁnition of a stable model used in the conference paper [6] and in related publications [13,16] is less general: it treats all predicate constants
occurring in F as intensional. We will see that this additional degree of generality is convenient (Section 3.2) but not very essential (Section 4.1).
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ﬁrst-order formula using the process of program completion. This method can be applied, in particular, to formula (2).
Remark 3. According to the original deﬁnition of a stable model [9], the only stable model of program (1) is its minimal
Herbrand model{
p(a,a), p(a,b),q(a)
}
. (10)
This fact is in agreement with the result of the calculation in Example 1, in the sense that (10) is the only Herbrand
interpretation satisfying (6). This is an instance of a general theorem about the relationship between the new, general
deﬁnition of a stable model and the original deﬁnition, which is stated in Section 3 below.
Example 2 (continued). If F is (7) then SMt[F ] is equivalent to CIRCt[F ], according to Remark 1. Consequently, in the t-stable
models of (7), t is the transitive closure of p. Similarly, if F is the conjunction of (7) and (8) then SMpt[F ] is equivalent to
CIRCpt[F ] and consequently to (9).
It is clear from the deﬁnition of circumscription that if sentences F and G are equivalent to each other then the formulas
CIRC[F ] and CIRC[G] are equivalent to each other as well. The following example shows, on the other hand, that the operator
SM, applied to two equivalent formulas, can produce formulas that are not equivalent to each other.
Example 3. Let us apply SMp to p(a) and to ¬¬p(a). (In logic programming notation the latter can be written as the
constraint ← not p(a).) It is clear that SMp[p(a)] equals CIRCp[p(a)] and is equivalent to
∀x(p(x) ↔ x= a).
On the other hand,
(¬¬p(a))∗ = ((p(a) → ⊥)→ ⊥)∗
= ((p(a) → ⊥)∗ → ⊥)∧ ((p(a) → ⊥)→ ⊥)
↔ ¬(p(a) → ⊥)∗ ∧ p(a)
= ¬((u(a) → ⊥)∧ (p(a) → ⊥))∧ p(a)
↔ p(a),
and consequently
SMp
[¬¬p(a)]↔ ¬¬p(a) ∧ ¬∃u((u < p) ∧ p(a))
↔ p(a) ∧ ¬∃u(u < p)
↔ p(a) ∧ ∀x¬p(x)
↔ ⊥.
Thus some equivalent transformations do not preserve the class of stable models of a formula. We will return to this
question in Section 5.1.
The following two examples show that sometimes SM is stronger than CIRC, and sometimes weaker.
Example 4. Let F be the formula
∀x(¬p(x) → q(x)), (11)
corresponding to the rule
q(x) ← not p(x).
The circumscription formula CIRCpq[F ] is equivalent to
∀x(¬p(x) ↔ q(x)).
On the other hand, using the fact that formula (11) is tight, we will show in Section 6 that SMpq[F ] can be written as
∀x(¬p(x) ∧ q(x)). (12)
Thus SMpq[F ] is stronger than CIRCpq[F ]. In any minimal model of (11), q is the negation of p; about the stable models of
this formula we can say more: p is identically false, and q is identically true.
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p-minimal models are characterized by the condition
∀x¬p(x)
(“p is empty”). Using the fact that formula (4) is tight, we will show in Section 6 that the p-stable models of (4) can be
described, in accordance with the intuitive meaning of the choice construct, by the weaker condition
∀x(p(x) → q(x)) (13)
(“p is a subset of q”).
3. Relation to other deﬁnitions of a stable model
In this section we relate the deﬁnition of a stable model in terms of the operator SM to the original deﬁnition of a stable
model [9] and to the generalization of that deﬁnition proposed in [8].
3.1. Review of the 1988 and 2005 deﬁnitions
Recall that a signature is a set of object, function and predicate constants. A term of a signature σ is formed from object
constants of σ and object variables using function constants of σ . We distinguish here between atoms and atomic formulas,
as follows: an atom of a signature σ is an n-ary predicate constant followed by a list of n terms; atomic formulas of σ are
atoms of σ , equalities between terms of σ , and the 0-place connective ⊥. First-order formulas of σ are built from atomic
formulas of σ using the binary propositional connectives and quantiﬁers listed at the beginning of Section 2.3. For any
signature σ containing at least one object constant, an Herbrand interpretation of σ is an interpretation of σ such that (i) its
universe is the set of ground terms of σ , and (ii) every ground term of σ represents itself. As usual, we identify an Herbrand
interpretation with the set of ground atoms that are satisﬁed by it.
A traditional program of a signature σ is a set of formulas of the form
A1 ∧ · · · ∧ Am ∧ ¬Am+1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬An → An+1 (14)
(nm 0), where each Ai is an atom of σ . If n = 0 then (14) is understood as A1.
For any traditional program Π of a signature σ and any set X of ground atoms of σ , the reduct of Π relative to X is the
set of formulas obtained from Π by
• replacing each formula from Π with all its ground instances, followed by
• removing all formulas (14) such that {Am+1, . . . , An} ∩ X 	= ∅, followed by
• removing the conjunctive terms ¬Am+1, . . . ,¬An from the antecedents of the remaining formulas.
The reduct of Π relative to X is a set of Horn clauses. If its least Herbrand model equals X then we say that X is a stable
model of Π in the sense of the 1988 deﬁnition [9].
The deﬁnition from [8] is applicable to arbitrary sets of propositional formulas, and, if we include in it a grounding
step, it will become applicable to arbitrary sets of quantiﬁer-free formulas. For any set Π of quantiﬁer-free formulas of a
signature σ and any set X of ground atoms of σ , the modiﬁed reduct of Π relative to X is the set of formulas obtained
from Π by
• replacing each formula from Π with all its ground instances, followed by
• replacing, in each formula F , all maximal subformulas of F that are not satisﬁed by X with ⊥.
If X is a minimal (relative to set inclusion) Herbrand model of the modiﬁed reduct of Π relative to X then we say that X
is a stable model of Π in the sense of the 2005 deﬁnition [8]. As shown in that paper, in application to any traditional program
the 1988 and 2005 deﬁnitions are equivalent to each other.
Example 6. Signature σ consists of the object constants a, b and the unary predicate constants p, q, r; Π is{
p(a), p(b),q(a), p(x) ∧ ¬q(x) → r(x)}; (15)
X is {
p(a), p(b),q(a), r(b)
}
. (16)
After grounding, Π becomes{
p(a), p(b),q(a), p(a) ∧ ¬q(a) → r(a), p(b) ∧ ¬q(b) → r(b)}.
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p(a), p(b),q(a), p(b) → r(b)}.
The least Herbrand model of the reduct equals X . Consequently X is a stable model of Π in the sense of the 1988 deﬁnition.
The modiﬁed reduct of Π relative to X is{
p(a), p(b),q(a),⊥ → ⊥, p(b) ∧ ¬⊥ → r(b)}.
Since X is a minimal model of the modiﬁed reduct, X is a stable model of Π in the sense of the 2005 deﬁnition.
3.2. Relation to the new deﬁnition
Theorem 1. For any signature σ containing at least one object constant and ﬁnitely many predicate constants, any ﬁnite set Π of
quantiﬁer-free formulas of σ , and any Herbrand interpretation X of σ , the following conditions are equivalent:
• X is a stable model of Π in the sense of the 2005 deﬁnition;
• X is a p-stable model of the conjunction of the universal closures of the formulas from Π , where p is the list of all predicate
constants of σ .
Corollary 1. For any signature σ containing at least one object constant and ﬁnitely many predicate constants, any ﬁnite traditional
program Π of σ , and any Herbrand interpretation X of σ , the following conditions are equivalent:
• X is a stable model of Π in the sense of the 1988 deﬁnition;
• X is a p-stable model of the conjunction of the universal closures of the formulas from Π , where p is the list of all predicate
constants of σ .
Example 6 (continued). The result of applying the operator SMpqr to the conjunction of the universal closures of formu-
las (15) can be rewritten, using the completion method described in Section 6 below, as
∀x(p(x) ↔ x= a∨ x= b)
∧∀x(q(x) ↔ x= a)
∧∀x(r(x) ↔ p(x) ∧ ¬q(x)). (17)
The stable model (16) of (15) is the only Herbrand model of this sentence.
In the statement of Theorem 1, the underlying signature is assumed to contain ﬁnitely many predicate constants, and Π
is supposed to consist of ﬁnitely many formulas. (The result of grounding Π can be inﬁnite though, if the signature contains
function constants.) The theorem shows that under these conditions the new deﬁnition of a stable model is a generalization
of the 2005 deﬁnition, and it is more general in three ways.
First, it is more general syntactically: it is applicable to formulas that contain both universal and existential quantiﬁers,
such as the “aggregate formula” (5) or the formula ∃x p(x) (“p is nonempty”). The result of applying the operator SMp to
the latter is the same as the result of applying the corresponding circumscription operator, and it is equivalent to
∃x∀y(p(y) ↔ x= y)
(“p is a singleton”).
Second, it is more general semantically: it is applicable to non-Herbrand interpretations. For instance, (17) has models
in which some elements of the universe are not represented by any of the constants a, b. That formula has also models in
which a and b represent the same element of the universe. In such a model, both p and q are singletons, and r is empty.
Third, it allows us to distinguish between intensional predicates and the other (“extensional”) predicate symbols. This is
often useful when we want to describe the intuitive meaning of a group of rules in a precise way. For instance, the claim
that under the stable model semantics formula (7) expresses the concept of transitive closure is only valid if we treat p as
extensional. (A way to express this claim without the use of extensional predicates is discussed in the next section.) See [7]
for other uses of this distinction.
4. Properties of SM
4.1. Changing the set of intensional predicates
The theorem below shows that making the set of intensional predicates smaller can only make the result of applying the
operator SM weaker, and that this can be compensated by adding “choice rules.” For any predicate constant p, by Choice(p)
we denote the formula ∀x(p(x) ∨ ¬p(x)), where x is a list of distinct object variables. For any list p of predicate constants,
Choice(p) stands for the conjunction of the formulas Choice(p) for all members p of p.
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valid:
SMpq[F ] → SMp[F ],
SMpq
[
F ∧ Choice(q)]↔ SMp[F ].
It follows that the class of p-stable models of a sentence F contains the class of pq-stable models of F and coincides
with the class of pq-stable models of F ∧ Choice(q).
We have seen, for instance, that the condition “t is the transitive closure of p” can be expressed by applying SMt to
formula (7). By Theorem 2, it follows that the same condition can be expressed by applying SMpt to the conjunction of (7)
and ∀x(p(x) ∨ ¬p(x)).
Thus the possibility of distinguishing between intensional and extensional predicates does not really make the concept
of a stable model more general: instead of designating a group q of predicates as extensional, we can conjoin the formula
with Choice(q).
In the rest of the paper we will assume that a list p of distinct predicate constants is chosen, and its members will be
referred to as intensional predicates. The predicate constants that do not belong to p will be called extensional predicates.
4.2. Constraints
In answer set programming, constraints—rules with the empty head, such as (3)—play an important role in view of the
fact that adding a constraint to a program affects the set of its stable models in a particularly simple way: it eliminates the
stable models that “violate” the constraint. The following theorem shows that sentences beginning with negation can be
viewed as a counterpart of constraints in the new framework.
Theorem 3. For any ﬁrst-order formulas F and G, SM[F ∧ ¬G] is equivalent to SM[F ] ∧ ¬G.
It follows that the stable models of a sentence of the form F ∧ ¬G can be characterized as the stable models of F that
satisfy ¬G .
For any predicate constant p, by False(p) we denote the formula ∀x¬p(x), where x is a list of distinct object variables.
By False(p) we denote the conjunction of the formulas False(p) for all members p of p.
Corollary 2. For any ﬁrst-order formula G, SM[¬G] is equivalent to
¬G ∧ False(p).
Indeed, if F is  then SM[F ∧ ¬G] is equivalent to SM[¬G], and SM[F ] is equivalent to False(p).
In Section 5.1 we will show that ¬G can be replaced in these two propositions by formulas of a more general syntactic
form.
4.3. Trivial predicates
In traditional theory of stable models, the predicate constants that do not occur in the heads of rules are “trivial,” in the
sense that no atom containing such a predicate can belong to a stable model. Theorem 4 shows what form this idea takes
in the new framework.
Theorem 4. For any ﬁrst-order formula F and any intensional predicate p, if every occurrence of p in F belongs to the antecedent of
an implication then the formula
SM[F ] → False(p)
is logically valid.
Consequently, if every occurrence of p in a sentence F belongs to the antecedent of an implication then p is identically
false in every stable model of F . For instance, the only occurrence of p in (7) is in the antecedent of an implication;
consequently, in all p-stable models of (7) p is identically false.
Recall that an occurrence of a predicate constant (or any other expression) in a formula is called positive if the number
of implications containing that occurrence in the antecedent is even, and strictly positive if that number is 0. The condition
“every occurrence of p in F belongs to the antecedent of an implication” in the statement of the theorem can be also
expressed by saying that F has no strictly positive occurrences of p.
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5.1. System SQHT=
As we saw in Section 2.4, two sentences that are equivalent to each other may have different stable models. Transfor-
mations of formulas that preserve the class of stable models were studied in [16], for the special case when all predicate
constants are intensional. The results of that paper imply, in particular, that two sentences have the same stable models
whenever they are intuitionistically equivalent.6 We will see that the same conclusion holds in the more general framework
proposed in this paper, with extensional predicates allowed.
Thus equivalent transformations that are sanctioned by intuitionistic logic play an important part in the study of stable
models. In connection with Example 3 above we can note, for instance, that the “fact” p(a) and the “constraint” ¬¬p(a)
are equivalent classically, but not intuitionistically; this is what makes them essentially different under the stable model
semantics. About formula (4), representing a choice rule, we can note that it is not provable in intuitionistic logic; this is
what makes it nontrivial, as far as stable models are concerned.
The main result of [16] is actually about a class of equivalent transformations that contains more than what intuitionistic
logic accepts. The “logic of here-and-there”7 studied in that paper is intermediate between intuitionistic and classical logic.
By INT= we denote intuitionistic ﬁrst-order predicate logic with the usual axioms for equality: x= x and the schema
x= y → (F (x) → F (y))
for every formula F (x) such that y is substitutable for x in F (x). System SQHT= (for “static quantiﬁed logic of here-and-there
with equality”) is obtained from INT= by adding the axiom schemas
F ∨ (F → G) ∨ ¬G
and
∃x(F (x) → ∀xF (x)),
and the axiom
x= y ∨ x 	= y.
To illustrate the difference between intuitionistic logic and the logic of here-and-there, we can note that De Morgan’s law
¬(F ∧ G) ↔ ¬F ∨ ¬G
and its ﬁrst-order counterpart
¬∀xF (x) ↔ ∃x¬F (x)
are not provable intuitionistically, but are provable in SQHT= .
If the equivalence between two sentences can be proved in SQHT= then they have the same stable models. We can
assert even more:
Theorem 5. For any ﬁrst-order formulas F and G, if the formula F ↔ G is derivable in SQHT= from the formulas Choice(q) for the
extensional predicates q then SM[F ] is equivalent to SM[G].
For instance, it is easy to see that the equivalence between (4) and the formula
∀x(p(x) ∨ ¬p(x) ∨ ¬q(x)) (18)
is intuitionistically derivable from Choice(q). The p-stable models of (4) are the interpretations that interpret p as a subset
of q (Section 2.4, Example 5). It follows that the p-stable models of (18) can be characterized in the same way.
Intermediate logics, such as SQHT= , differ from classical logic in that they do not endorse the law of double negation
¬¬F ↔ F in full generality. The following theorem identiﬁes a class of cases when double negation elimination is admissible
under the stable model semantics.
Theorem 6. Let F ′ be the formula obtained from a ﬁrst-order formula F by inserting ¬¬ in front of a subformula G. If G has no strictly
positive occurrences of intensional predicates then SM[F ′] is equivalent to SM[F ].
6 See http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-intuitionistic/ for an introduction to intuitionistic logic.
7 This name is related to the fact that SQHT= can be described by Kripke models with two worlds (see Appendix A.5.1), often called Here and There.
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∀xy(H → x= y) (19)
every occurrence of every predicate constant belongs to the antecedent of an implication. Consequently, inserting a double
negation in front of (19) within any sentence will not affect the class of stable models no matter how the set of intensional
predicates is chosen. (In the terminology of Section 5.2 below, this is a “strongly equivalent” transformation.)
From Theorem 6 we can conclude that Theorem 3 and Corollary 2 can be generalized: SM[F ∧ G] is equivalent to
SM[F ]∧G , and SM[G] is equivalent to G∧False(p), whenever G has no strictly positive occurrences of intensional predicates.
For instance, SM[F ∧ ∀xy(H → x= y)] is equivalent to SM[F ] ∧ ∀xy(H → x= y).
A generalization of Theorem 6 is presented in [7, Section 5].
5.2. Strong equivalence
About ﬁrst-order formulas F and G we say that F is strongly equivalent to G if, for any formula H , any occurrence of F
in H , and any list p of distinct predicate constants, SMp[H] is equivalent to SMp[H ′], where H ′ is obtained from H by
replacing the occurrence of F by G . In this deﬁnition, H is allowed to contain object, function and predicate constants that
do not occur in F , G; Theorem 7 below shows, however, that this is not essential. It shows also that in the deﬁnition of
strong equivalence p can be taken to be the set pF G of all predicate constants that occur in F or G , rather than an arbitrary
set of predicate constants:
Theorem 7. First-order formulas F and G are strongly equivalent to each other iff for any formula H such that every object, function
or predicate constant occurring in H occurs in F or in G, and for any occurrence of F in H, SMpF G [H] is equivalent to SMpF G [H ′],
where H ′ is obtained from H by replacing the occurrence of F by G.
It is clear that if F is strongly equivalent to G then SMp[F ] is equivalent to SMp[G] (take H to be F ). In particular, if F
is strongly equivalent to G then F is equivalent to G (take p to be empty).
Strong equivalence was originally deﬁned, in somewhat different contexts, in [15] (for propositional rules with nested
expressions, without extensional atoms, and assuming that F occurs in H as a conjunctive term) and in [16] (no free
variables in F , G; no extensional predicates; F occurs in H as a conjunctive term). Properties of this relation are interesting
from the perspective of ASP because they may allow us to simplify a part of a logic program without looking at the other
parts. For instance, replacing the rule p(x) ← x = a in any program with p(a) does not affect the class of stable models,
because the formula
∀x(x= a → p(x)) (20)
is strongly equivalent to p(a).
The main result of [16] can be extended to the new version of strong equivalence as follows:
Theorem 8. First-order formulas F and G are strongly equivalent to each other iff formula F ↔ G is provable in SQHT= .
For instance, to prove that (20) is strongly equivalent to p(a) we only need to observe that these formulas are intuition-
istically equivalent.
The deﬁnition of strong equivalence can be generalized as follows. For any list q of predicate constants, we say that F is
strongly equivalent to G excluding q if F ∧ Choice(q) is strongly equivalent to G ∧ Choice(q). It is immediate from Theorem 8
that F is strongly equivalent to G excluding q iff F ↔ G is derivable in SQHT= from the formula Choice(q). Theorem 8 is
the special case of this corollary when q is empty. Furthermore, it is clear from Theorem 5 that if F is strongly equivalent
to G excluding q then SMp[F ] is equivalent to SMp[G] for any p that is disjoint from q.
An alternative characterization of strong equivalence, similar to the one proposed in [22] for the propositional case, refers
to the formula F ∗(u) that was used in Section 2.3 to deﬁne the operator SM. In the statement of the theorem below, pF G
is again the list of all predicate constants that occur in F or G; q is a list of new, distinct predicate constants of the same
length as pF G .
Theorem 9. F is strongly equivalent to G iff the formula(
q pFG
)→ (F ∗(q) ↔ G∗(q))
is logically valid.
For instance, we can prove that (20) is strongly equivalent to p(a) by showing that the implication
(q p) → (∀x((x= a → q(x))∧ (x= a → p(x)))↔ q(a))
is logically valid.
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As indicated in Section 2.4, the process of completing a logic program, invented by Keith Clark [1], allows us in many
cases to rewrite SM[F ] as a ﬁrst-order formula.
6.1. Clark normal form
The completion process involves a series of preliminary transformations followed by the main step—replacing implica-
tions by equivalences. For instance, completing program (1) can be described as follows. Step 1: in the representation (2) of
the program in the syntax of ﬁrst-order logic, we rewrite each conjunctive term as an implication with the consequent in a
canonical form—a predicate constant followed by a list of distinct variables:
∀xy(x= a∧ y = a → p(x, y))∧ ∀xy(x= a∧ y = b → p(x, y))
∧ ∀xy(p(x, y) → q(x)).
Step 2: we combine implications with the same predicate constant in the consequent into one:
∀xy(((x = a∧ y = a) ∨ (x = a∧ y = b))→ p(x, y))
∧ ∀xy(p(x, y) → q(x)).
Step 3: we identify, in each implication, the variables that occur in its antecedent but do not occur in the consequent, and
minimize the scopes of the corresponding quantiﬁers:
∀xy(((x = a∧ y = a) ∨ (x = a∧ y = b))→ p(x, y))
∧ ∀x(∃yp(x, y) → q(x)). (21)
Step 4: we replace all implications by equivalences:
∀xy(p(x, y) ↔ (x= a∧ y = a) ∨ (x = a∧ y = b))
∧ ∀x(q(x) ↔ ∃y p(x, y)). (22)
Steps 1–3 are intuitionistically equivalent transformations, so that formula (21) has the same stable models as the for-
mula (2) that we started with. Step 4 gives us in this case, and in many others, a ﬁrst-order formula equivalent to the result
of applying the operator SM.
This idea can be made precise using the following deﬁnitions. About a ﬁrst-order formula we will say that it is in Clark
normal form (relative to the list p of intensional predicates) if it is a conjunction of formulas of the form
∀x(G → p(x)), (23)
one for each intensional predicate p, where x is a list of distinct object variables. The completion of a formula F in Clark
normal form, denoted by Comp[F ], is obtained from it by replacing each conjunctive term (23) with
∀x(p(x) ↔ G). (24)
For instance, (11) can be written in Clark normal form relative to pq as follows:
∀x(⊥ → p(x))∧ ∀x(¬p(x) → q(x)). (25)
The completion of this formula is
∀x(p(x) ↔ ⊥)∧ ∀x(q(x) ↔ ¬p(x)). (26)
Some formulas can be converted to Clark normal form by strongly equivalent transformations different from those described
in [1]. For instance, formula (4) is strongly equivalent to
∀x(q(x) ∧ ¬¬p(x) → p(x)), (27)
because F ∨ ¬G is equivalent to ¬¬G → F in SQHT= . Formula (27) is in Clark normal form relative to p. Its completion is
∀x(p(x) ↔ q(x) ∧ ¬¬p(x)), (28)
or, equivalently, (13).
We are interested in the relationship between Comp[F ] and SM[F ]. In traditional theory of stable models, every stable
model of a logic program is an Herbrand model of its completion; the converse, however, can be asserted only under
some syntactic conditions of F , such as tightness [4,2]. Here is the counterpart of the ﬁrst of these two facts in the new
framework:
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SM[F ] → Comp[F ]
is logically valid.
To illustrate the fact that Comp[F ] can be weaker than SM[F ], consider the following formula, which is intuitionistically
equivalent to (7):
∀xy(p(x, y) ∨ ∃z(t(x, z) ∧ t(z, y))→ t(x, y)). (29)
It is in Clark normal form, provided that t is taken to be the only intensional predicate. Its completion is weaker than the
result of applying the operator SMt to (7)—the latter, as we know, is not expressible in ﬁrst-order logic.
6.2. Tight formulas
We will now deﬁne tightness for formulas in Clark normal form. In Section 7.3 this deﬁnition will be extended to
arbitrary ﬁrst-order formulas.
We say that an occurrence of a predicate constant in a formula is negated if it belongs to a subformula of the form ¬F
(that is, F → ⊥), and nonnegated otherwise.
For any formula F in Clark normal form, the predicate dependency graph of F is the directed graph that
• has all intensional predicates as its vertices, and
• has an edge from p to q if the antecedent G of the conjunctive term (23) of F with p in the consequent has a positive
nonnegated occurrence of q.
We say that F is tight if the predicate dependency graph of F is acyclic.
For example, (21) is tight: its predicate dependency graph has only one edge, from q to p. Formulas (25) and (27) are
tight as well: their predicate dependency graphs have no edges. (The antecedent in (27) has a positive occurrence of p,
but that occurrence is negated.) On the other hand, (29) is not tight: the only edge of its predicate dependency graph is a
self-loop.
Theorem 11. For any tight formula F in Clark normal form, SM[F ] is equivalent to the completion of F .
In particular, the stable models of a tight sentence in Clark normal form can be characterized as models of its completion.
This theorem shows, for instance, that the result of applying the operator SMpq to (2) is equivalent to formula (22). Since
that formula can be equivalently rewritten as (6), we have justiﬁed the claim regarding Example 1 made in Section 2.4.
Similarly, the result of applying SMpq to (11) is equivalent to (26). Since that formula can be equivalently rewritten
as (12), we have justiﬁed the claim made there regarding Example 4.
Similarly, the result of applying SMp to (4) is equivalent to (28). Since that formula can be equivalently rewritten as (13),
we have justiﬁed the claim made there regarding Example 5.
These examples illustrate the process that sometimes allows us to rewrite SM[F ] as a ﬁrst-order formula:
• turn F into a tight formula in Clark normal form using strongly equivalent transformations, and
• form its completion (and simplify the result).
This process can be generalized in several ways. First, translating F into a tight formula F1 in Clark normal form can
employ transformations that are strongly equivalent excluding the extensional predicates; then the equivalence F ↔ F1 will
be derivable in SQHT= from the formulas Choice(q) for extensional predicates q, and that is enough to guarantee that SM[F ]
is equivalent to SM[F1] (Theorem 5). Second, if we turned F into a conjunction of the form F1 ∧ ¬G , where F1 is in Clark
normal form, then Theorem 3 can be used to “factor out” ¬G . Finally, if F is turned into a formula in Clark normal form
that is not tight then in some cases tightness can be achieved by an additional transformation based on Theorem 6. For
instance, the predicate dependency graph of a formula containing the conjunctive term
∀x(((p(x) → q(x))→ r(x))→ p(x))
has a self-loop at p. But if the predicate r is extensional then that term can be replaced with
∀x(¬¬((p(x) → q(x))→ r(x))→ p(x))
without changing the class of stable models. The self-loop is eliminated.
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The pointwise circumscription operator [18] is a modiﬁcation of circumscription that reﬂects the idea of “pointwise
minimality”: it is impossible to make the minimized predicates stronger by changing the truth value of exactly one of them at
exactly one point. In this section, we deﬁne a similar modiﬁcation of the operator SM and show that it is closely related to
the process of completion discussed above.8
7.1. Review of pointwise circumscription
The deﬁnition of pointwise circumscription uses the following notation. If p and q are predicate constants of the same
arity k then p
1
< q stands for the formula
∃x(q(x) ∧ ∀y(p(y) ↔ (q(y) ∧ x 	= y))),
where x, y are disjoint tuples of distinct object variables x1, . . . , xk , y1, . . . , yk , and x 	= y is shorthand for
¬(x1 = y1 ∧ · · · ∧ xk = yk).
The formula p
1
< q expresses that the extent of p can be obtained from the extent of q by removing one element. If p and
q are tuples p1, . . . , pn and q1, . . . ,qn of predicate constants then p
1
< q stands for the disjunction
∨
1in
((
pi
1
< qi
)∧ ∧
1 jn, j 	=i
(p j = q j)
)
,
and similarly for tuples of predicate variables.
Let p be a list of distinct predicate constants. The pointwise circumscription operator with the minimized predicates p, de-
noted by PCIRCp , is deﬁned as follows: for any ﬁrst-order formula F , PCIRCp[F ] stands for
F ∧ ¬∃u((u 1< p)∧ F (u)),
where u and F (u) are as in the deﬁnition of circumscription (Section 2.2). For any sentence F , a pointwise p-minimal model
of F is an interpretation of the underlying signature that satisﬁes PCIRCp[F ].
It is clear that every minimal model is pointwise minimal. But the converse is not true. For instance, let F be p(a) ↔
p(b). An interpretation that makes p true at two distinct points a, b and false in the rest of the universe is not minimal—it
can be “improved” by making p identically false. But it is pointwise minimal, because changing the value of p at one of the
points a, b would not produce a model of F .
Unlike CIRC[F ], the pointwise circumscription formula PCIRC[F ] can be equivalently rewritten without second-order
quantiﬁers. We will describe this process in terms of predicate expressions λxF (x), where x is a list of distinct object vari-
ables, and F (x) is a formula. For any formula H(u), where u is a predicate variable, by H(λxF (x)) we denote the formula
obtained from H(u) by replacing each atomic subformula of the form u(t), where t is a tuple of terms, with F (t). For
instance, if H(u) is u(a) ∨ u(b) then H(λx¬p(x)) stands for ¬p(a) ∨ ¬p(b).
For any predicate variable v and any formula H(v), by H (1)v (v) we denote the formula
∃x(v(x) ∧ H(λy(v(y) ∧ x 	= y))),
where x and y are disjoint lists of distinct variables. It is easy to see that this formula is equivalent to
∃u((u 1< v)∧ H(u)).
Indeed,
∃u((u 1< v)∧ H(u))
= ∃u(∃x(v(x) ∧ ∀y(u(y) ↔ (v(y) ∧ x 	= y)))∧ H(u))
↔ ∃u∃x(v(x) ∧ ∀y(u(y) ↔ (v(y) ∧ x 	= y))∧ H(u))
↔ ∃x(v(x) ∧ ∃u(∀y(u(y) ↔ (v(y) ∧ x 	= y))∧ H(u)))
↔ H (1)v (v).
To generalize this construction to tuples of distinct predicate variables, we deﬁne H (1)v1···vn as shorthand for
H (1)v1 ∨ · · · ∨ H (1)vn .
8 In propositional case, an analogy between pointwise circumscription and completion was noted in [12].
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∃u((u 1< v)∧ H(u))
(to simplify notation, we assume that n = 2):
∃u1u2
((
(u1,u2)
1
< (v1, v2)
)∧ H(u1,u2))
↔ ∃u1u2
((((
u1
1
< v1
)∧ (u2 = v2))∨ ((u1 = v1) ∧ (u2 1< v2)))∧ H(u1,u2))
↔ ∃u1u2
(((
u1
1
< v1
)∧ (u2 = v2))∧ H(u1,u2))
∨ ∃u1u2
((
(u1 = v1) ∧
(
u2
1
< v2
))∧ H(u1,u2))
↔ ∃u1
((
u1
1
< v1
)∧ H(u1, v2))∨ ∃u2((u2 1< v2)∧ H(v1,u2))
↔ H (1)v1 (v1, v2) ∨ H (1)v2 (v1, v2)
= H (1)v1v2(v1, v2).
Consequently, PCIRCp[F ] is equivalent to
F ∧ ¬F (1)u (p),
which is a ﬁrst-order formula. For instance, this translation turns
PCIRCp
[
p(a) ↔ p(b)]
into the ﬁrst-order formula(
p(a) ↔ p(b))∧ ¬∃x(p(x) ∧ ((p(a) ∧ x 	= a)↔ (p(b) ∧ x 	= b))),
which can be further rewritten as
∀x¬p(x) ∨ (a 	= b ∧ ∀x(p(x) ↔ x= a∨ x= b)).
7.2. Operator PSM
The pointwise stable model operator with the intensional predicates p, denoted by PSMp , is deﬁned as follows: for any ﬁrst-
order formula F , PSMp[F ] stands for
F ∧ ¬∃u((u 1< p)∧ F ∗(u)),
where u and F ∗(u) are as in the deﬁnition of the stable model operator (Section 2.3). For any sentence F , a pointwise
p-stable model of F is an interpretation of the underlying signature that satisﬁes PSMp[F ].
Every stable model is pointwise stable, but the converse is generally not true. Furthermore, PSM[F ] is equivalent to the
ﬁrst-order formula
F ∧ ¬(F ∗)(1)u (p).
We see that there is a similarity between properties of PSM and properties of completion. Indeed, for any sentence F in
Clark normal form, every stable model of F satisﬁes the completion of F (Theorem 10), but the converse is generally not
true; the completion of F is a ﬁrst-order formula. The difference is, of course, that the deﬁnition of PSM is more general—it
is not limited to sentences in Clark normal form.
Theorem 12(b) below shows that this is more than a similarity: PSM can be viewed as a generalization of completion.
About a sentence in Clark normal form we say that it is pure if, for each of its conjunctive terms (23), G has no strictly
positive occurrences of p. For instance, every tight sentence is pure. Any formula in Clark normal form can be made pure
using auxiliary predicates. For instance, formula (29) is not pure, but we can make it pure using the auxiliary predicate t′ ,
“synonymous” with t:
∀xy(p(x, y) ∨ ∃z(t(x, z) ∧ t(z, y))→ t′(x, y))∧ ∀xy(t′(x, y) → t(x, y)).
Theorem 12. For any formula F in Clark normal form, (a) the implication
PSM[F ] → Comp[F ]
is logically valid; (b) if F is pure then PSM[F ] is equivalent to Comp[F ].
When applied to a formula in Clark normal form that is not pure, PSM provides, generally, a better approximation to SM
than the completion operator.
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As the ﬁnal comment on the concept of a pointwise stable model, we will show how to extend the tightness condi-
tion from formulas in Clark normal form to arbitrary formulas so that a counterpart of Theorem 11 will hold: for a tight
formula F , SM[F ] will be equivalent to PSM[F ] (and consequently equivalent to a ﬁrst-order formula).
A rule of a ﬁrst-order formula F is a strictly positive occurrence of an implication in F . For instance, the only rule of (2)
is p(x, y) → q(x). (Note that the ﬁrst two conjunctive terms of (2) are not rules, according to our deﬁnition.) If F is a
formula in Clark normal form then its rules are the implications G → p(x) from its conjunctive terms (23). The rules of the
formula(
p(x) → (q(x) → r(x)))∨ ((p(y) → q(y))→ r(y))
are
p(x) → (q(x) → r(x)), q(x) → r(x), (p(y) → q(y))→ r(y).
For any ﬁrst-order formula F , the predicate dependency graph of F (relative to the list p of intensional predicates) is the
directed graph that
• has all intensional predicates as its vertices, and
• has an edge from p to q if, for some rule G → H of F ,
· p has a strictly positive occurrence in H , and
· q has a positive nonnegated occurrence in G .
We say that F is tight (relative to p) if its predicate dependency graph is acyclic.
In application to formulas in Clark normal form, the new deﬁnition of tightness is equivalent to the deﬁnition from
Section 6.2. But it allows us to talk, for instance, about the predicate dependency graph of formula (2) itself, without
converting it to Clark normal form, and say that (2) itself is tight. Incidentally, this formula and its normal form (21) have
the same predicate dependency graph, and this is a general phenomenon: strongly equivalent transformations involved in
converting a sentence to its Clark normal form do not usually change its predicate dependency graph, and consequently do
not affect its tightness.
Theorem 13. For any tight formula F , PSM[F ] is equivalent to SM[F ].
Corollary 3. For any tight formula F , SM[F ] is equivalent to a ﬁrst-order formula.
8. Strong negation
Some applications of answer set programming are facilitated by the use of a second kind of negation, called “strong” or
“classical” [10].
Strong negation can be incorporated in the framework of this paper as follows. We distinguish between intensional
predicates of two kinds, positive and negative, and assume that each negative intensional predicate has the form ∼p, where
p is a positive intensional predicate. Under this approach to strong negation, the symbol ∼ is, syntactically, not a connective;
it occurs within atomic formulas. An interpretation of the underlying signature is coherent if the extent of every negative
predicate ∼p in it is disjoint from the extent of the corresponding positive predicate p. In other words, an interpretation is
coherent if it satisﬁes the formula
¬∃x(p(x) ∧ ∼p(x)), (30)
where x is a list of distinct object variables, for each negative predicate ∼p.
By Theorem 3, the coherent stable models of a sentence F can be characterized as the stable model of the conjunction
of F with all formulas (30).
Strong negation allows us to distinguish between two kinds of exceptions to defaults: when the default is not applicable,
so that the property asserted by the default is not guaranteed to hold, and when we know that the property indeed does
not hold. For instance, the formula
∀x(¬ab(x) → p(x))∧ ab(c1) ∧ ab(c2) ∧ ∼p(c2) (31)
employs the “abnormality predicate” ab to express that
• by default, any object is presumed to have property p,
• this default is applicable neither to c1 nor to c2,
• c2 does not have property p.
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stants treated as intensional, by a ﬁrst-order formula:
∀x(ab(x) ↔ x= c1 ∨ x= c2)∧
∀x(p(x) ↔ x 	= c1 ∧ x 	= c2)∧
∀x(∼p(x) ↔ x= c2).
According to this formula, all objects other than c1 and c2 have property p (line 2); as to c1 and c2, it is not known whether
the former has property p, but the latter certainly doesn’t (line 3).
All stable models of (31) are coherent. But this will change if we drop the conjunctive term ab(c2) from that formula,
that is to say, if we assert ∼p(c2) but do not restrict accordingly the default that leads to the opposite conclusion. The
completion formula will turn then into
∀x(ab(x) ↔ x= c1)∧
∀x(p(x) ↔ x 	= c1)∧
∀x(∼p(x) ↔ x= c2).
This sentence has no coherent models satisfying c1 	= c2.
9. Related work
Propositional equilibrium logic [32] extends the stable model semantics from traditional programs to propositional for-
mulas, and the deﬁnition of a stable model for ﬁrst-order sentences proposed in this paper is a natural next step. It is
closely related to the extension of equilibrium logic to ﬁrst-order formulas described in Appendices A.5.1 and A.5.2.
Theorem 5 from [24] relates stable models of traditional programs to circumscription using a translation that introduces
auxiliary predicate constants. Our approach to stable models is closer, however, to two more recent publications: [31],
which shows how to express the semantics of propositional equilibrium logic by quantiﬁed Boolean formulas, and [23],
which translates equilibrium logic into the logic of knowledge and justiﬁed assumptions from [21]. (An extended version
of [23] is published in this issue.)
Non-Herbrand stable models, at least for traditional programs, can be deﬁned on the basis of several characterizations of
the stable model semantics proposed earlier, including [24,35,20].
Extensional predicates are similar to input predicates in the sense of [30].
10. Conclusion
The approach to stable models proposed in this paper is more general than the traditional deﬁnition because it is
applicable to syntactically complex formulas, because it covers non-Herbrand models, and because it allows us to distinguish
between intensional and extensional predicates. Syntactically complex formulas are useful in the context of the stable model
semantics in view of their relation to aggregates. Non-Herbrand models are related to the use of arithmetic functions in logic
programs. Extensional predicates provide a useful technical device, as discussed in [7].
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Appendix A. Proofs of theorems
A.1. Proof of Theorem 1
Given a formula F without variables and a set X of ground atoms, by F X we denote the modiﬁed reduct of F relative
to X (Section 3.1), that is, the result of replacing all maximal subformulas of F that are not satisﬁed by X with ⊥. Similar
notation will be used for sets of ground formulas.
Lemma 1. (See [5, Lemma 22].) X | F X iff X | F .
Proof. Immediate from the deﬁnition of F X . 
Lemma 2. (See [5, Lemma 23].) (a) (F ∧ G)X is equivalent to F X ∧ GX ; (b) (F ∨ G)X is equivalent to F X ∨ GX .
252 P. Ferraris et al. / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 175 (2011) 236–263Proof. (a) If X satisﬁes F ∧ G then the formulas (F ∧ G)X and F X ∧ GX are equal to each other; otherwise, each of them is
equivalent to ⊥. (b) Similar. 
The following lemma is a key to the proof of Theorem 1. It relates the modiﬁed reduct operator to the operator F →
F ∗(u) introduced in Section 2.3. In the statement of the lemma,
• H(x) is a quantiﬁer-free formula, x is the list of all its variables, and t is a list of ground terms of the same length as x;
• p is the list of all predicate constants occurring in H(x), and q is a list of new predicate constants of the same length
as p;
• X is a set of ground atoms that contain a predicate constant from p, Y is a subset of X , and Y pq is the set of ground
atoms obtained from Y by substituting the members of q for the corresponding members of p.
Lemma3. The Herbrand interpretation Y satisﬁes H(t)X iff the Herbrand interpretation X∪Y pq satisﬁes the sentence H∗(q, t) obtained
from H∗(u,x) by substituting q for the predicate variables u and t for the object variables x.
Proof. By induction on H .
Case 1: H(x) has the form t1(x) = t2(x). Then H∗(q, t) is t1(t) = t2(t); X ∪ Y pq satisﬁes this sentence iff t1(t) equals t2(t).
On the other hand, H(t)X is t1(t) = t2(t) if t1(t) equals t2(t), and ⊥ otherwise.
Case 2: H(x) has the form p(t′(x)), where t′(x) is a tuple of terms. Then H∗(q, t) is q(t′(t)), where q is the member of q
corresponding to the member p of p; X ∪ Y pq satisﬁes this sentence iff p(t′(t)) belongs to Y . On the other hand, H(t)X is
p(t′(t)) if this atom belongs to X , and ⊥ otherwise. Since Y ⊆ X , Y satisﬁes H(t)X iff p(t′(t)) belongs to Y .
Case 3: H(x) is ⊥; trivial.
Case 4: H(x) is a conjunction or a disjunction; use Lemma 2.
Case 5: H(x) is H1(x) → H2(x). Then H∗(q, t) is
H(t) ∧ (H∗1(q, t) → H∗2(q, t)). (A.1)
Case 5.1: X | H(t). Then the Herbrand interpretation X ∪ Y pq satisﬁes the conjunction (A.1) iff it satisﬁes its second
term H∗1(q, t) → H∗2(q, t). On the other hand, H(t)X is in this case H1(t)X → H2(t)X , and it remains to apply the induction
hypothesis.
Case 5.2: X 	| H(t). Then X ∪ Y pq does not satisfy (A.1), and H(t)X is ⊥. 
Theorem 1. For any signature σ containing at least one object constant and ﬁnitely many predicate constants, any ﬁnite set Π of
quantiﬁer-free formulas of σ , and any Herbrand interpretation X of σ , the following conditions are equivalent:
• X is a stable model of Π in the sense of the 2005 deﬁnition;
• X is a p-stable model of the conjunction of the universal closures of the formulas from Π , where p is the list of all predicate
constants of σ .
Proof. Let Πg be the set of all ground instances of the formulas from Π , let x be the list of all variables occurring in Π ,
and let F (x) be the conjunction of all formulas from Π . In view of Lemma 1, X is a stable model of Π in the sense of the
2005 deﬁnition iff
(i) X satisﬁes Πg , and
(ii) no proper subset Y of X satisﬁes Π Xg .
On the other hand, X is a p-stable model of ∀xF (x) iff
(i′) X satisﬁes ∀xF (x), and
(ii′) X does not satisfy ∃u((u< p) ∧ ∀xF ∗(u,x)).
It is clear that (i) is equivalent to (i′). By Lemma 2(a), condition (ii) can be reformulated as follows: no proper subset Y of X
satisﬁes all of the formulas (F (t))X for arbitrary tuples t of ground terms. Condition (ii′) can be reformulated in terms of a
tuple of new predicate constants q: there is no proper subset Y of X such that, for every tuple t of ground terms, X ∪ Y pq
satisﬁes F ∗(q, t). By Lemma 3, it follows that (ii) is equivalent to (ii′). 
A.2. Proof of Theorem 2
Lemma 4. For any list p of predicate constants, Choice(p)∗(u) is equivalent to p u.
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∀x(u(x) ∨ (¬u(x) ∧ ¬p(x)));
p  u is
∀x(p(x) → u(x)). 
Theorem 2. For any ﬁrst-order formula F and any disjoint lists p, q of distinct predicate constants, the following formulas are logically
valid:
SMpq[F ] → SMp[F ],
SMpq
[
F ∧ Choice(q)]↔ SMp[F ].
The proof is not long, but there is a notational diﬃculty that we need to overcome before we can present it. The notation
F ∗(u) introduced in Section 2.3 does not take into account the fact that the construction of this formula depends on the
choice of the list p of intensional predicates. Since the dependence on p is essential in the proof of Theorem 2, we use here
the more elaborate notation F ∗[p](u). For instance, if F is p(x) ∧ q(x) then
F ∗[p](u) is u(x) ∧ q(x),
F ∗[pq](u, v) is u(x) ∧ v(x).
It is easy to verify by induction on F that for any disjoint lists p, q of distinct predicate constants,
F ∗[p](u) = F ∗[pq](u,q). (A.2)
Proof of Theorem 2. (i) In the notation introduced above, SMp[F ] is
F ∧ ¬∃u((u< p) ∧ F ∗[p](u)).
By (A.2), this formula can be written also as
F ∧ ¬∃u((u< p) ∧ F ∗[pq](u,q)),
which is equivalent to
F ∧ ¬∃u(((u,q) < (p,q))∧ F ∗[pq](u,q)).
On the other hand, SMpq[F ] is
F ∧ ¬∃uv(((u,v) < (p,q))∧ F ∗[pq](u,v)).
To prove (ii), note that, by (A.2) and Lemma 4, the formula
∃uv(((u,v) < (p,q))∧ F ∗[pq](u,v) ∧ Choice(q)∗[pq](u,v))
is equivalent to
∃uv(((u,v) < (p,q))∧ F ∗[pq](u,v) ∧ (q= v)).
It follows that it can be also equivalently rewritten as
∃u((u< p) ∧ F ∗[pq](u,q)).
By (A.2), the last formula can be represented as
∃u((u< p) ∧ F ∗[p](u)). 
A.3. Proof of Theorem 3
Lemma 5. The formula
(u p) ∧ F ∗(u) → F
is logically valid.
Proof. By induction on F . 
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u p→ ((¬F )∗(u) ↔ ¬F )
is logically valid.
Proof. Immediate from Lemma 5. 
Theorem 3. For any ﬁrst-order formulas F and G, SM[F ∧ ¬G] is equivalent to SM[F ] ∧ ¬G.
Proof. By Lemma 6,
SMp[F ∧ ¬G] = F ∧ ¬G ∧ ¬∃u
(
(u< p) ∧ (F ∧ ¬G)∗(u))
⇔ F ∧ ¬G ∧ ¬∃u((u< p) ∧ F ∗(u) ∧ ¬G)
⇔ F ∧ ¬∃u((u< p) ∧ F ∗(u))∧ ¬G
= SMp[F ] ∧ ¬G. 
A.4. Proof of Theorem 4
Lemma 7. Assume that the set of intensional predicates is divided into two parts p, q so that every occurrence of every predicate
constant from p in F belongs to the antecedent of an implication. Then the formula
(u p) → (F ∗(u,q) ↔ F )
is logically valid.
(Lemma 6 is the special case of this assertion when F has the form ¬G , and q is empty.)
Proof. By induction on F . We will consider the case when F is G → H ; the other cases are straightforward. Assume u p.
By Lemma 5, it follows that G∗(u,q) → G; by the induction hypothesis, H∗(u,q) ↔ H . Consequently
F ∗(u,q) = (G∗(u,q) → H∗(u,q))∧ (G → H)
⇔ (G∗(u,q) → H)∧ (G → H)
⇔ (G∗(u,q) ∨ G)→ H
⇔ G → H
= F . 
Theorem 4. For any ﬁrst-order formula F and any intensional predicate p, if every occurrence of p in F belongs to the antecedent of
an implication then the formula
SM[F ] → False(p)
is logically valid.
Proof. Let q be the set of all intensional predicates other than p. The formula to be proved can be written as
F ∧ ¬False(p) → ∃uv(((u,v) < (p,q))∧ F ∗(u,v)). (A.3)
Assume F ∧ ¬False(p), and take u such that u < p. By Lemma 7, it follows that F ∗(u,q). Hence(
(u,q) < (p,q)
)∧ F ∗(u,q),
which implies the consequent of (A.3). 
A.5. Proofs of Theorems 5–8
It is convenient to prove Theorems 7 and 8 before Theorems 5 and 6. As a preliminary step, in Lemma 9 below we
extend the work on the relationship between stable models and propositional equilibrium logic described in [32] to the
ﬁrst-order case.
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Notation: the universe of an interpretation I is denoted by |I|; for any signature σ and any set U , σ U stands for the
extension of σ obtained by adding distinct new symbols ξ∗ , called names, for all ξ ∈ U as object constants. We will identify
an interpretation I of σ with its extension to σ |I| deﬁned by I(ξ∗) = ξ . By σf we denote the part of σ consisting of its
object and function constants.
An HT-interpretation of σ is a triple I = 〈I f,Ih,It〉, where
• I f is an interpretation of σf , and
• Ih, It are sets of atomic formulas formed using predicate constants from σ and the names of elements of |I f| such
that Ih ⊆ It .
The symbols h (“here”) and t (“there”) are called worlds; they are ordered by the relation h < t. The value that I f assigns
to a ground term t of signature σf|I
f| will be denoted by tI .
The satisfaction relation |
ht
between an HT-interpretation I , a world w , and a ﬁrst-order sentence F of the signature σ |If| ,
is deﬁned recursively:
• I,w |
ht
p(t1, . . . , tk) if p((tI1 )
∗, . . . , (tIk )
∗) ∈ Iw ;
• I,w |
ht
t1 = t2 if tI1 = tI2 ;
• I,w 	|
ht
⊥;
• I,w |
ht
F ∧ G if I,w |
ht
F and I,w |
ht
G;
• I,w |
ht
F ∨ G if I,w |
ht
F or I,w |
ht
G;
• I,w |
ht
F → G if, for every world w ′ such that w  w ′ ,
I,w ′ 	|
ht
F or I,w ′ |
ht
G;
• I,w |
ht
∀xF (x) if, for each ξ ∈ |I f|, I,w |
ht
F (ξ∗);
• I,w |
ht
∃xF (x) if, for some ξ ∈ |I f|, I,w |
ht
F (ξ∗).
We say that I satisﬁes F , and write I |
ht
F , if I,h |
ht
F . It is easy to check by induction on F that this condition implies
I, t |
ht
F .
As shown in [16], system SQHT= is sound and complete relative to this semantics: for any set Γ of sentences, a sen-
tence F is derivable from Γ in SQHT= iff F is satisﬁed by every HT-interpretation that satisﬁes all formulas from Γ .
An interpretation I (in the sense of classical logic) of a signature σ can be represented as a pair 〈 J , X〉, where J is the
restriction of I to σ f , and X is the set of the atomic formulas, formed using predicate constants from σ and the names
of elements of |I|, which are satisﬁed by I . The lemma below uses this notation to describe the relationship between the
satisﬁability relation for HT-interpretations and the transformation F → F ∗(u) introduced in Section 2.3. We assume that σ
contains ﬁnitely many predicate constants, and the list of these constants is denoted by p. By σ+ we denote the signature
obtained from σ by adding new predicate constants q, one per each member of p. About an atomic formula formed using
a predicate constant from σ+ and names of elements of |I| we say that it is a p-atom if its predicate constant belongs to
p, and that it is a q-atom otherwise. As in Appendix A.1, for any set X of p-atoms we denote by Xpq the set of the q-atoms
that are obtained from the elements of X by replacing their predicate constants by the corresponding predicate constants
from q.
Lemma 8. For any HT-interpretation I and any ﬁrst-order sentence F of the signature σ |If| ,
(i) I, t |
ht
F iff 〈I f,It〉 | F iff 〈I f, (Ih)pq ∪ It〉 | F ;
(ii) I,h |
ht
F iff 〈I f, (Ih)pq ∪ It〉 | F ∗(q).
Proof. Each part is easy to check by induction on the size of F . Consider, for instance, the proof of (ii) for the case of
implication. We will write I for 〈I f, (Ih)pq ∪ It〉. By the induction hypothesis,
I,h |
ht
F iff I | F ∗(q),
I,h |
ht
G iff I | G∗(q).
By part (i) of the lemma,
I, t |
ht
F iff I | F ,
I, t | G iff I | G.ht
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I,h |
ht
F → G
iff
[I,h 	|
ht
F or I,h |
ht
G
]
and
[I, t 	|
ht
F or I, t |
ht
G
]
iff
[
I 	| F ∗(q) or I | G∗(q)] and [I 	| F or I | G]
iff I | F ∗(q) → G∗(q) and I | F → G
iff I | (F ∗(q) → G∗(q))∧ (F → G)
iff I | (F → G)∗(q). 
A.5.2. First-order equilibrium logic and stable models
An HT-interpretation 〈I f,Ih,It〉 is total if Ih = It. A total HT-interpretation 〈I, X, X〉 is an equilibrium model of a sen-
tence F of the signature σ |I| if
(i) 〈I, X, X〉 |
ht
F , and
(ii) for any proper subset Y of X , 〈I, Y , X〉 	|
ht
F .
It is easy to check by induction on F that condition (i) above is equivalent to 〈I, X〉 | F .
In the following lemma, σ is a signature containing ﬁnitely many predicate constants.
Lemma 9. For any total HT-interpretation 〈I, X, X〉 of σ and any ﬁrst-order sentence F of σ |I| , 〈I, X, X〉 is an equilibrium model of F
iff 〈I, X〉 is a p-stable model of F , where p is the list of all predicate constants of σ .
Proof. From Lemma 8(ii) we conclude that condition (ii) from the deﬁnition of an equilibrium model can be reformulated
as follows: for any proper subset Y of X ,〈
I, Y pq ∪ X
〉 	| F ∗(q).
This is equivalent to saying that there is no set Y of p-atoms such that〈
I, Y pq ∪ X
〉 | (q< p) ∧ F ∗(q),
and consequently equivalent to the condition
〈I, X〉 | ¬∃u((u< p) ∧ F ∗(u)).
It follows that 〈I, X, X〉 is an equilibrium model of F iff
〈I, X〉 | F ∧ ¬∃u((u< p) ∧ F ∗(u)). 
A.5.3. Proof of Theorems 7 and 8
The assertions of Theorems 7 and 8 (Section 5.2) can be jointly reformulated as follows:
For any ﬁrst-order formulas F and G, the following conditions are equivalent:
(i) F is strongly equivalent to G,
(ii) for any formula H such that every object, function or predicate constant occurring in H occurs in F or in G, and for any occurrence
of F in H, SMpF G [H] is equivalent to SMpF G [H ′], where H ′ is obtained from H by replacing the occurrence of F by G,
(iii) formula F ↔ G is provable in SQHT= .
The proof repeats, with minor modiﬁcations, the argument from [16].
From (i) to (ii): Obvious.
From (ii) to (iii): By x we will denote the list of variables that are free in F or in G , and we will write F as F (x), and G
as G(x). Our goal is to show that F (x) ↔ G(x) is provable in SQHT= . Without loss of generality, we can assume that every
predicate constant in the underlying signature σ belongs to pF G . Take an HT-interpretation I and a tuple c of names of the
same length as x. We need to show that I satisﬁes F (c) iff I satisﬁes G(c). Assume, for instance, that I |
ht
F (c), and denote
the formula Choice(pF G) by C . Case 1: I is total. By (ii),
SMpFG
[
F (x) ∧ C] is equivalent to SMpFG [G(x) ∧ C],
and consequently
SMpFG
[
F (c) ∧ C] is equivalent to SMpFG [G(c) ∧ C].
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F (c) ∧ C, G(c) ∧ C (A.4)
have the same equilibrium models. Since I is total and satisﬁes F (c), I is an equilibrium model of the ﬁrst of the formu-
las (A.4). Consequently, it is an equilibrium model of the second, so that I |
ht
G(c). Case 2: I is not total. Let J be the total
HT-interpretation 〈I f,It,It〉. From the assumption I |
ht
F (c) we can conclude that I, t |
ht
F (c), and, by Lemma 8(i), that
J |
ht
F (c). Furthermore, by reasoning as in Case 1 with J in place of I , we conclude that J |
ht
G(c). By (ii),
SMpFG
[
F (x) ∧ (G(x) → C)]
is equivalent to
SMpFG
[
G(x) ∧ (G(x) → C)],
and consequently
SMpFG
[
F (c) ∧ (G(c) → C)]
is equivalent to
SMpFG
[
G(c) ∧ (G(c) → C)].
By Lemma 9, it follows that the sentences
F (c) ∧ (G(c) → C), G(c) ∧ (G(c) → C) (A.5)
have the same equilibrium models. The latter can be rewritten as
G(c) ∧ C . (A.6)
Since J is a total HT-interpretation satisfying G(c), it is an equilibrium model of (A.6). Consequently, J is an equilibrium
model of the ﬁrst of the formulas (A.5). Hence that formula is not satisﬁed by I . Since its ﬁrst conjunctive term F (c) is
satisﬁed by I , we conclude that I does not satisfy the second term G(c) → C . Since I, t |
ht
C , this is only possible when
I,h |
ht
G(c), that is, I |
ht
G(c).
From (iii) to (i): Let H ′ be obtained from H by replacing an occurrence of F by G , and let p be a list of predicate
constants. We will denote by x the list of variables that are free in at least one of the formulas H , H ′ , and we will write H
as H(x), and H ′ as H ′(x). Our goal is to show that SMp[H(x)] is equivalent to SMp[H ′(x)]. Without loss of generality we
can assume that every predicate constant in the underlying signature σ occurs in H(x) or H ′(x), so that the set of predicate
constants in σ is ﬁnite. Let q be the list of predicate constants from σ that do not belong to p. By Theorem 2, it is suﬃcient
to prove that SMpq[H ′(x) ∧ Choice(q)] is equivalent to SMpq[H(x) ∧ Choice(q)]. Take an interpretation 〈I, X〉 of σ and a
tuple c of names, of the same length as x. We need to show that H ′(c) ∧ Choice(q) and H(c) ∧ Choice(q) have the same
pq-stable models. By Lemma 9, this is equivalent to saying that these two sentences have the same equilibrium models. It
remains to note that the equivalence between these two sentences is provable in SQHT= , and consequently these sentences
are satisﬁed by the same HT-interpretations. 
A.5.4. Proof of Theorem 5
Theorem 5. For any ﬁrst-order formulas F and G, if the formula F ↔ G is derivable in SQHT= from the formulas Choice(q) for the
extensional predicates q then SM[F ] is equivalent to SM[G].
Proof. Let p be the list of intensional predicates, and let q be the list of all other predicate constants occurring in F or in G .
Since F ↔ G is derivable in SQHT= from Choice(q), the formula
F ∧ Choice(q) ↔ G ∧ Choice(q)
is provable in SQHT= . By Theorem 8, it follows that the left-hand side is strongly equivalent to the right-hand side. It follows
that SMpq[F ∧ Choice(q)] is equivalent to SMpq[G ∧ Choice(q)]. By Theorem 2, we can conclude that SMp[F ] is equivalent to
SMp[G]. 
A.5.5. Proof of Theorem 6
Lemma 10. If a formula G has no strictly positive occurrences of predicate constants from a list p then G ↔ ¬¬G is derivable in
SQHT= from the formulas Choice(q) for the predicate constants q that occur in G but do not belong to p.
Proof. By induction on G , using the fact that the equivalences
¬¬(F ∧ G) ↔ ¬¬F ∧ ¬¬G,
¬¬(F ∨ G) ↔ ¬¬F ∨ ¬¬G,
¬¬(F → G) ↔ F → ¬¬G
are provable in SQHT= . 
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positive occurrences of intensional predicates then SM[F ′] is equivalent to SM[F ].
Proof. Immediate from Lemma 10 and Theorem 5. 
A.6. Proof of Theorem 9
Theorem 9. F is strongly equivalent to G iff the formula(
q pFG
)→ (F ∗(q) ↔ G∗(q)) (A.7)
is logically valid.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we can assume that every predicate constant in the underlying signature σ belongs
to pF G . By x we will denote the list of variables that are free in F or in G , and we will write F as F (x), G as G(x), F ∗(q)
as F ∗(q,x), G∗(q) as G∗(q,x), and pF G as p.
By Theorem 8, the condition
F (x) is strongly equivalent to G(x)
is equivalent to the condition
F (x) ↔ G(x) is provable in SQHT=.
It can be further reformulated as follows:
for any HT-interpretation 〈I, Y , X〉
and for any tuple c of names of the same length as x,
〈I, Y , X〉 |
ht
F (c) iff 〈I, Y , X〉 |
ht
G(c).
By Lemma 8(ii), the last line can be equivalently rewritten as〈
I, Y pq ∪ X
〉 | F ∗(q, c) iff 〈I, Y pq ∪ X 〉 | G∗(q, c).
Consequently F (x) is strongly equivalent to G(x) iff
for any interpretation I of σ f , any sets X and Y of p-atoms,
and any tuple c of names of the same length as x,〈
I, Y pq ∪ X
〉 | q p∧ F ∗(q, c) iff 〈I, Y pq ∪ X 〉 | q p∧ G∗(q, c).
This condition is equivalent to the logical validity of (A.7). 
A.7. Proof of Theorems 10 and 12
Theorem 10 follows from part (a) of Theorem 12, so that we only need to prove the latter. Let the intensional predicates
be p1, . . . , pn . By ei(xi) we denote the tuple
p1, . . . , pi−1, λyi
(
pi
(
yi
)∧ yi 	= xi), pi+1, . . . , pn,
where yi is a tuple of new distinct variables.
Lemma 11. For any formula F , the implications
F ∗
(
ei
(
xi
))→ F (i = 1, . . . ,n)
are logically valid.
Proof. Immediate from Lemma 5. 
Lemma 12. If a formula F does not contain strictly positive occurrences of pi then F ∗(ei(xi)) is equivalent to F .
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Recall that a formula in Clark normal form can be written as
n∧
i=1
∀xi(Gi → pi(xi)), (A.8)
where each xi is a list of distinct variables.
Lemma 13. If F is (A.8) then PSM[F ] is equivalent to
F ∧
n∧
i=1
∀xi(pi(xi)→ G∗i (ei(xi))).
Proof. As discussed in Section 7.2, PSM[F ] is equivalent to the ﬁrst-order formula
F ∧ ¬(F ∗)(1)u (p).
Formula (F ∗)(1)u (p) can be written as∨
i
(∃xi(pi(xi)∧ F ∗(ei(xi)))).
Consequently, PSM[F ] can be equivalently rewritten as
F ∧
∧
i
∀xi(pi(xi)→ ¬F ∗(ei(xi))).
To prove the assertion of the lemma, it remains to derive the equivalence between
¬F ∗(ei(xi)) (A.9)
and
G∗i
(
ei
(
xi
))
(A.10)
from assumption F .
Formula F ∗(u) can be rewritten, under assumption F , as the conjunction of the formulas
∀y j(G∗j (u) → u j(y j))
for all j = 1, . . . ,n. The j-th term of the tuple ei(xi) is λyi(pi(yi) ∧ yi 	= xi) if j = i, and p j otherwise. Consequently, the
j-th conjunctive term of F ∗(ei(xi)) is
∀yi(G∗i (ei(xi))→ (pi(yi)∧ yi 	= xi)), (A.11)
if j = i, and
∀y j(G∗j (ei(xi))→ p j(y j)) (A.12)
otherwise. Lemma 11 shows that in the presence of the conjunctive term
∀y j(G j → p j(y j))
of F , the conjunctive term (A.11) of F ∗(ei(xi)) can be rewritten as
∀yi(G∗i (ei(xi))→ yi 	= xi), (A.13)
and the other conjunctive terms (A.12) can be dropped altogether. We conclude that formula (A.9) can be written as
¬∀yi(G∗i (ei(xi))→ yi 	= xi),
which is equivalent to
∃yi(G∗i (ei(xi))∧ yi = xi), (A.14)
and consequently to (A.10). 
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PSM[F ] → Comp[F ]
is logically valid; (b) if F is pure then PSM[F ] is equivalent to Comp[F ].
Proof. If F is (A.8) then Comp[F ] is equivalent to
F ∧
∧
i
∀xi(pi(xi)→ Gi). (A.15)
On the other hand, by Lemma 13, PSM[F ] is equivalent to
F ∧
∧
i
∀xi(pi(xi)→ G∗i (ei(xi))).
Claim (a) follows by Lemma 11. To prove claim (b), note that when F is pure then G∗i (e
i(xi)) is equivalent to Gi by
Lemma 12. 
A.8. Proofs of Theorems 11 and 13
Since every tight program is pure, Theorem 11 follows from Theorem 12(b) and Theorem 13. Consequently we only need
to prove Theorem 13.
In the following lemma, F is a ﬁrst-order formula, p is the list of intensional predicates p1, . . . , pn , and u is a tuple of
distinct predicate variables u1, . . . ,un .
Lemma 14. Let S be the set of i’s such that pi has a strictly positive occurrence in F . The formula(
(u p) ∧
∧
i∈S
(ui = pi)
)
→ (F ↔ F ∗(u))
is logically valid.
Proof. By induction on F . We will consider the case when F is G → H ; the other cases are straightforward. It is suﬃcient
to derive the implication
(G → H) → (G∗(u) → H∗(u)) (A.16)
from the assumption
(u p) ∧
∧
i∈S
(ui = pi). (A.17)
Since every i such that pi has a strictly positive occurrence in H belongs to S , it follows from the induction hypothesis that
the implication(
(u p) ∧
∧
i∈S
(ui = pi)
)
→ (H ↔ H∗(u)) (A.18)
is logically valid. By Lemma 5, the implication
(u p) ∧ G∗(u) → G (A.19)
is logically valid also. It remains to observe that (A.16) is a propositional consequence of (A.17), (A.18), and (A.19). 
Recall that an occurrence of a predicate constant in a formula is called positive if the number of implications containing
that occurrence in the antecedent is even (Section 4.3); if that number is odd then the occurrence is negative. Negative
occurrences should be distinguished from negated occurrences—those belonging to a subformula of the form F → ⊥ (Sec-
tion 6.2). In the following lemmas, v is a tuple of distinct predicate variables disjoint from u.
Lemma 15. Let S+ be the set of i’s such that pi has a positive nonnegated occurrence in F , and let S− be the set of i’s such that pi has
a negative nonnegated occurrence in F . The formulas
(a) ((u v) ∧ (v p) ∧∧i∈S+(ui = pi)) → (F ∗(v) → F ∗(u)),
(b) ((u v) ∧ (v p) ∧∧i∈S−(ui = pi)) → (F ∗(u) → F ∗(v))
are logically valid.
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is an implication G → H . Case 1: H is ⊥, so that F is ¬G . By Lemma 6, the formulas
u p→ (F ∗(u) ↔ F ),
v p→ (F ∗(v) ↔ F )
are logically valid. Consequently formula (a) is logically valid also. Case 2: H is different from ⊥. Then each pi that has a
nonnegated occurrence in G or H has a nonnegated occurrence in F as well. Denote the antecedent of (a) by Ant; then (a)
can be written as
Ant → ((F ∧ (G∗(v) → H∗(v)))→ (F ∧ (G∗(u) → H∗(u)))). (A.20)
By part (b) of the induction hypothesis applied to G , the formula
Ant → (G∗(u) → G∗(v)) (A.21)
is logically valid. By part (a) of the induction hypothesis applied to H , the formula
Ant → (H∗(v) → H∗(u)) (A.22)
is logically valid. It remains to observe that (A.20) is a propositional consequence of (A.21) and (A.22). 
Lemma 16. Let D be the set of edges of the predicate dependency graph of F . The formula(
(u v) ∧ (v p) ∧
∧
i, j: (pi ,p j)∈D
(u j = p j ∨ vi = pi)
)
→ (F ∗(u) → F ∗(v))
is logically valid.
Proof. By induction on F . We will only consider the case when F is an implication G → H . Let Ant be the antecedent
(u v) ∧ (v p) ∧
∧
i, j: (pi ,p j)∈D
(u j = p j ∨ vi = pi)
of the formula in question, and let S be the set of i’s such that pi has a strictly positive occurrence in F . It is suﬃcient to
establish the logical validity of the formulas(
Ant ∧
∧
i∈S
vi = pi
)
→ (F ∗(u) → F ∗(v)) (A.23)
and
(Ant ∧ vi 	= pi) →
(
F ∗(u) → F ∗(v)) (i ∈ S). (A.24)
From Lemma 14 we conclude that the formula(
Ant ∧
∧
i∈S
vi = pi
)
→ (F ↔ F ∗(v))
is logically valid; (A.23) is a propositional consequence of this formula, in view of the fact that F is a conjunctive term of
F ∗(u). Formula (A.24) is a propositional consequence of
(Ant ∧ vi 	= pi) →
((
G∗(u) → H∗(u))→ (G∗(v) → H∗(v))), (A.25)
so that the proof will be completed if we establish the logical validity of the latter for each i ∈ S .
Note ﬁrst that every edge of the dependency graph of H is an edge of the dependency graph of F . Consequently the
induction hypothesis implies that the formula
Ant → (H∗(u) → H∗(v)) (A.26)
is logically valid. Furthermore, it is clear from the deﬁnition of Ant that the formula
(Ant ∧ vi 	= pi) →
∧
j: (pi ,p j)∈D
u j = p j
is a tautology. Let S+ be the set of j’s such that p j has a positive nonnegated occurrence in G . By the deﬁnition of the
predicate dependency graph, (pi, p j) ∈ D whenever i ∈ S and j ∈ S+ . Consequently
(Ant ∧ vi 	= pi) →
∧
+
u j = p jj∈S
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(Ant ∧ vi 	= pi) →
(
G∗(v) → G∗(u)) (A.27)
is logically valid. It remains to observe that (A.25) is a propositional consequence of (A.26) and (A.27). 
Theorem 13. For any tight formula F , PSM[F ] is equivalent to SM[F ].
Proof. We only need to prove the implication left-to-right. Since F is tight, we can assume without loss of generality
that the members p1, . . . , pn of p are ordered in such a way that i < j for all edges (pi, p j) of the dependency graph
of F . Assume PSM[F ] and u < p; we need to derive ¬F ∗(u). Let m be the largest i such that ui 	= pi . Take x such that
pm(x) ∧ ¬um(x). Choose v as follows: vi is λy(pi(y) ∧ x 	= y) if i =m, and pi otherwise. Then
(u v) ∧ (v p) ∧
∧
i, j: (pi ,p j)∈D
(u j = p j ∨ vi = pi). (A.28)
Indeed, the conjunctive terms u v and v p are immediate, as well as the second disjunctive term of u j = p j ∨ vi = pi
for any i different from m. Any j such that (pm, p j) ∈ D is greater than m; by the choice of m, we get the ﬁrst disjunctive
term u j = p j . From (A.28) and the formula from Lemma 16,
F ∗(u) → F ∗(v).
On the other hand, v
1
< p, so that, in view of PSM[F ], we can conclude that ¬F ∗(v). Consequently ¬F ∗(u). 
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